Buddhism and disability: toward a socially engaged Buddhist ‘theology’ of bodily inclusiveness by Scherer, B. & Scherer, B.
Canterbury Christ Church University’s repository of research outputs
http://create.canterbury.ac.uk
Please cite this publication as follows: 
Scherer, B. (2016) Buddhism and disability: toward a socially engaged Buddhist 
‘theology’ of bodily inclusiveness. Journal of the International Association of 
Buddhist Universities, 9. pp. 26-35. 
Link to official URL (if available):
http://www.iabu.org/JIABU2016v9
This version is made available in accordance with publishers’ policies. All material 
made available by CReaTE is protected by intellectual property law, including 
copyright law. Any use made of the contents should comply with the relevant law.
Contact: create.library@canterbury.ac.uk
  
 
  
  
  
  
 
The Journal of the 
International Association of Buddhist Universities 
 
(JIABU) Volume IX, 2016 
Buddhism & ASEAN Regional Issues 
 
(Digital Edition) 
  
  
  
  
 
  
  
JIABU, Volume IX, 2016   vi 
 
 
Table of Contents:   
 
The Social Structure of Loving-Kindness in Buddhist Populations of 
the ASEAN Region (And Neighbors) - A Sociological Analysis 
Dr. José A. Rodríguez Díaz                    1 
 
Buddhism and Disability: Toward a Socially Engaged Buddhist 
‘Theology’ of Bodily Inclusiveness  
Dr. Bee Scherer                26 
 
Evaluating the “Unconscious in Dream” between Sigmund Freud 
and the Buddhist Tipiṭaka 
Mr. P.B. Tan                   36 
 
The Doctrine of Buddha-Nature in Mahāyāna Buddhism 
Dr. Tony Sin-Heng See                 47 
 
Understanding Principles and Community Practices Related to Non-
Violence and Conflict Resolution from an Islamic Tradition 
Mr. Amjad Mohamed-Saleem                 57 
 
The Bodhisattva Ideal and Socially Engaged Buddhism: A 
Progressive Approach 
Asst. Prof. Dr. Priyasen Singh                 70 
 
Interpretation of Concept of Nibbāna in Engaged Buddhism: A Case 
Study on Engaged Buddhist Leaders 
Ven. Phan Anh Duoc                  81 
 
Contribution towards the Peace and Security of Southeast Asia 
through Venerable Chin Kung’s Idea of “Multicultural Education” 
Mr. Saiping An                   94 
 
The “Holy Men’s” Uprisings in the Thai Political Dynamics: Merits 
Counted 
Venerable Yuande Shih                101 
 
Sinxay as a Jataka Nauk Nibat – A Jataka Outside the Circle 
Mr. Peter Whittlesey                 109 
 
Cham Architecture in Viet Nam 
Asst. Prof. Dr. Arvind Kumar Singh              119 
 
 
 
JIABU, Volume IX, 2016   26 
 
 
Buddhism and Disability: 
Toward a Socially Engaged Buddhist ‘Theology’ of Bodily Inclusiveness1 
 
 
Prof. Dr. Bee Scherer 
Director, International Centre for Inclusion and Social Justice 
Canterbury Christ Church University, United Kingdom 
 
Introduction:  
Following on from current discourses within critical disability studies, I investigate 
the parameters, opportunities and challenges of some Buddhist responses to variable 
bodies.  Negotiating the different Buddhist modes between ‘karmatic’ sociology and 
‘nirvāṇic’ soteriology, I develop outlines of Socially Engaged Buddhist ‘theology’ of 
bodily inclusiveness, arguing for a person-centered, non-judgmental approach to bodily 
variability and neuro-diversity.  I conclude with critical ruminations about oppressive 
normalcy and by pointing out some pathways to navigating variability-affirming 
‘anthroposcapes’ - landscapes of embodied human experiences. 
Recently, Chris Mounsey has proposed a shift in critical disability studies, away 
from the Foucauldian emphasis on the notion of compulsory ableism - as e.g. in McRuer’s 
Crip Theory2 - toward a fuller emphasis on and an appreciation of the individual embodied 
experience.3   Mounsey theorises this approach under the concept of variability, “same only 
different”4 as a discursive replacement to ‘disability’.  Consciously or not, Mounsey’s 
radical reconceptualization and celebration of sameness in difference contrast-imitates 
Homi Bhabha’s observations on the oppressive fixation as “a ‘partial’ presence” of the 
colonial subject through “the ambivalence of mimicry (almost the same, but not quite).”5  
The postcolonial critique of oppressive identity construction through mimicry is 
transformed for critical disability theory into the variability approach: Mounsey’s same 
only different affords, without center and margin, any variable body the complete autonomy 
of an embodied presence while leaving empathic, unoppressive recognizability in sameness 
intact.  
This article testifies to the fact that focusing on the body can facilitate history, 
speaking to the presence - without the necessity of anachronistic categorizations and retro-
diagnoses.  This does not preclude - or devalue the usefulness of - diachronic 
phenomenological and philosophical meanderings, in particular when the focus, limitations 
and parameters of such enquiries are clearly defined.  With these caveats, I would like to 
open up a dialogue between contemporary critical disability theory with Buddhist thought, 
moving in this chapter from investigating selected variable bodies within the circumscribed 
yet still somewhat fluid, fuzzy and messy discursive context of Buddhist practices, 
narratives and philosophies6 to infusing ‘variability’ as a critical angle with Buddhist 
                                                 
1 This article is slightly adapted from Scherer, Bee.  2016: “Variable Bodies, Buddhism and (No-)Selfhood: Towards 
Dehegemonized Embodiment.”  In The Variable Body in History (QP in Focus 1), edited by Chris Mounsey and Stan 
Booth, 247-263, Oxford: Peter Lang. 
2 Robert McRuer, Crip Theory: Cultural Signs of Queerness and Disability (NYU Press: New York, 2006).   
3 Chris Mounsey, “Introduction: Variability – Beyond Sameness and Difference,” in The Idea of Disability in the 
Eighteenth Century, edited by Chris Mounsey (Bucknell University Press: Lewisburg, 2014), 1-27. 
4  Ibid., 18. 
5 Homi Bhabha, The Location of Culture (New York and London: Routledge, [1994] 2012), 123; emphasis in the 
original. 
6 In this article, I do not attempt to provide a survey of the vast streams of Buddhist traditions in their relationship to 
‘disability’.  A useful - yet by its lack of direct access to primary texts quite limited - compilation of literature on 
Buddhism and disability in Asia is M. Mills, ‘Buddhism and Responses to Disability, Mental Disorders and Deafness in 
Asia.  A bibliography of historical and modern texts with introduction and partial annotation, and some echoes in 
Western countries’ (West Midlands, 2013), http://cirrie.buffalo.edu/bibliography/buddhism/, (accessed 12 April 2016).    
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‘theology’ (i.e. Buddhist constructive-critical thought).  I aim to demonstrate how 
embodied and body-oppressive normativities - and the margins they produce - can 
successfully be challenged through the lens of the conjunct Buddhist principles of 
interdependency, cause & effect; and no self.  In conclusion I dare to finish this non-
Foucauldian article with a (post-)Foucauldian critique of oppressive normalcy and I will 
attempt to point out some pathways to navigating variability-affirming ‘anthroposcapes’7 - 
landscapes of embodied human experiences.  
 
Buddhist Variable Bodies 
Buddhist approaches to the body flow from two pivotal angles: soteriology and 
sociology, i.e. aspiration and (conditioned) socio-cultural reality.  On the level of aspiration 
and soteriology the Buddhist traditions approach bodies as fields of transformative virtue 
while, on the level of socio-cultural realities, bodies are seen as limiting or expedient 
expressions of past actions and ripened conditions.  Both approaches are based on the key 
Buddhist tenets of karma as the law of cause and effect; and of the pratītyasamutpāda - 
‘dependent arising’.  Buddhist bodies are constructed within the parameter of Buddhist 
(virtue) Ethics or virtuosity.8  However, variant embodied abilities, while linked to past 
actions, are not attributable to individualized (non-)virtue, since the Buddhist key tenet of 
‘no-self’ (anātman) precludes the judgmental attribution of causal agency to an individual 
core, self or soul: instead, phenomena and empiric persons manifest as karmic continuities 
without essential identities attached.  The ensuing conundrum of cause & effect and rebirth 
without a Self is itself the subject of intensive philosophical and doctrinal debate9; however, 
Buddhist Modernisms10 have mostly solved the riddle by firmly pointing to the non-
ontological nature of the Buddhist teachings: Without ontological assumptions of, e.g. 
‘self’, ‘soul’ or even ‘mind’ and without any essentialized notion of ultimate reality, a 
particular meaningful way to understand the framework of the Buddhist intention-led, yet 
subject-essence-free karmatic theory arises as an exercise in deconstruction of essentialism 
by practice (or performance in [Judith] Butlerian terms).  
In this pedagogical or ‘andragogical’11 reading of Buddhism and Buddhist praxis - 
i.e. thought and performance -, questions of ontologically essentialized selfhood and truths 
are rendered obsolete in favor of the soteriological pragmatics, experience-oriented 
andragogy aiming only at showing methods to enduring happiness.  In the famous Snake 
Simile Sutta of the Pāli canon’s Middle Length Discourses, the Buddha as interlocutor 
proclaims “I only teach suffering and its ending.”12 This can be read as the Buddha saying 
that he does not concern himself with essentialized identities; ontology, cosmology and 
other conceptualizations of reality.  Instead, the focus of his teachings is freedom from 
dukkha: ‘pain’, ‘unsatisfactoriness’ or ‘suffering’.  Dukkha in Buddhist terms is juxtaposed 
to sukha: ‘happiness’, and points to the lack (duḥ-) of permanent happiness (kha).  The 
Buddhist concept of suffering includes the inextricably interpolated complexes of 
individual psycho-physical integrity as the dukkha-dukkhatā, the pain of experiencing pain, 
                                                 
7 Bee Scherer, ‘Crossings and Dwellings: Being behind Transphobia,’ paper given at the conference Fear and Loathing: 
Phobia in Literature and Culture, 9-10 May 2014, University of Kent, U.K. Available at the Queering Paradigms blog, 
http://queeringparadigms.com/2014/08/11/crossings-and-dwellings-being-behind-transphobia/ (accessed 12 April 
2016). 
8 Susanne Mrozik, Virtuous Bodies: The Physical Dimensions of Morality in Buddhist Ethics (Oxford University Press: 
Oxford, 2007). 
9 B. Scherer, “Karma: The Transformations of a Buddhist Conundrum,” in Vajrayana Buddhism in Russia: History and 
Modernity, edited by Chetyrova, L.B. et al. (St Petersburg State University: St. Petersburg, 2009), 259-285.   
10 David L. McMahan, The Making of Buddhist Modernism (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2008). 
11 Scherer, ‘Karma’, 265 and 277-8. 
12 dukkhañceva paññāpemi dukkhassa ca nirodhaṃ M 22 I 140.  Pāli texts referred to are the editions of the Pāli Text 
Society, London.  Abbreviations follow the Critical Pāli Dictionary (see the Epilegomena to Vol. 1 and online at 
http://pali.hum.ku.dk/cpd/intro/vol1_epileg_abbrev_texts.html, accessed 12 April 2016). 
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within ever-changing and fluid conditioned reality as the sankhāra-dukkhatā, the pain of 
karmatic flux, and the ensuing experience of lack, due to the constant change, the 
vipariṇāma-dukkhatā.  
The Buddhist notion of karma without individually essentialized agent and of 
rebirth without anyone who is reborn, hence, points to the experience of our ever-changing 
spatial, temporal and ‘cosmic’ (psycho-spiritual) context as a continuity without 
ontological, fixed identity – a flow without essence.  In this reading of Buddhist philosophy, 
widening Butler’s concept of performativity to the extreme, reality itself is performance.  
The view of simple, variable causalities without self - without judging, blaming, shaming, 
and guilt-trapping variable embodiments - mitigates the Buddhist karmatic views on 
‘disability’ or embodied variabilities: it can be argued that that from a Buddhist point of 
view body variances express genealogies or actualizations of generic human potentials 
rather than essentialized, individual histories of (non-)virtue.  
This non-judgmental and in its potential arguably dehegemonic Buddhist approach 
does not preclude the moralizing of (un)virtuous Buddhist bodies in cautionary narratives; 
nor has it on the level of socio-cultural organization and expression prevented Buddhists 
and Buddhisms from variability-based discriminatory practices – most importantly on the 
level of the monastic discipline.  All extant and still valid and mostly enforced Buddhist 
monastic codes preclude applicants with physical and mental variabilities from ordination.  
For example, in the Theravāda tradition the Pāli canon’s section on monastic discipline or 
vinaya congenital and acquired impairment are physiomorally grouped together with those 
having received corporeal punishments - such as branding, scourging, marking as robber, 
cutting off of hands, feet, ears, nose, fingers, thumb, tendons - with congenital and/or 
acquired variabilities - such as webbed fingers, humpback, dwarfism; deformity; blindness, 
dumbness, deafness, lameness and other walking impairments; paralysis - and general 
medical problems such as infirmity, bad health, contagious disease; goiter; elephantiasis.13 
The list is quite consistent across the five extant early vinaya traditions.14  Equally, those 
seen as having non-normative sex/gender – i.e. the ‘neither-male-nor-female’ paṇḍakas 
and the ‘both-and’ intersex15 - were and are prohibited from ordination; interestingly, were 
they inadvertently ordained their ordination was deemed annulled16 while the inadvertent 
ordination of those disqualified due to impairments such as various degrees of blindness, 
deafness, skeletal deformation etc., was and is still deemed as valid.17  
Ordination to the Buddhist monastic community was and is not governed by 
soteriology but according to social context and societal pragmatics.  The vinaya rules 
establish a physiomoral elite in-group, which feels the need guard itself from societal 
damage both by behavior and by association.  However, Buddhist modernisms are 
challenging the elite status of the monastics by privileging soteriology above sociology.  
Modernist lay movements in particular in the Global North vocally advocate equality of 
virtuosi status for householders and non-monastic ‘yogis’ in Buddhist praxis; 
transnationally, many ‘new’ lay Buddhist modernists move their traditions along onto a 
path of democratization, dehierarchization and counter-heteropatriarchal reform.  In this 
context, it is relevant to keep in mind that the traditional monastic rules are, indeed, limited 
to the governance of monastic elite: they cannot be argued to establish a universal ethical 
governance or code, which could be utilized to encouraging discrimination.  
                                                 
13 Mahāvagga Vin I 71 i 91; cp. IX, 4, 10-11 i 322; Vin I 76 i 93-95 adds leprosy, boils, eczema and epilepsy.  
14 For the parallels on ‘cripples’ in the other four early Buddhist vinaya traditions see the references in Erich 
Frauwallner, The Earliest Vinaya and the Beginnings of Buddhist Literature (Is.M.E.O.: Rome, 1956), 77. 
15 Vin I 61 i 85-86; see Bee Scherer, “Variant Dharma: Buddhist Queers, Queering Buddhisms” in Queering Paradigms 
VI (Oxford: Peter Lang 2016).  
16 Vin IX, 4, 10 i 322. 
17 Vin IX, 4, 11 i 322. 
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In doctrinal terms, the imperative of universal compassion is absolute paramount in 
Buddhisms and explicitly includes ‘out-groups’ and the marginalized.  All variabilities – 
within and without the normative boundaries - are seen as manifestation of karma.  Those 
physically and/or socially afflicted by these manifestations are prominently deserving of 
love-in-action.  In canonical stories we can find that caring for ‘the blind and old parents’18 
is narratively constructed as a valid reason for refusing to become a monk, as happened in 
the case of the potter Ghāṭikāra; and Buddhist rulers regularly are praised in chronicles as 
sustaining institutions for the blind and sick and otherwise variable.19 
From a Buddhist modernist point of view it can be argued that, what has opened up 
Buddhist traditions to discriminatory interpretations of - and practices with regard to – 
variabilities, is the popular and unsophisticated utilization of karma theory in the form of 
attributing guilt and shame for past(-lives) actions.  This form of moralizing ignores the 
intricacies of Buddhist psychologies of (no-)selfhood and is based on cautionary 
explanations of karma abounding in Buddhist scriptures.  In the Buddhist canonical texts 
karmatic ‘foolishness’, equaling to non-virtuous behavior, is directly linked to non-
favorable physical variability, e.g. prominently in the Theravāda Pāli canon in the 
Discourse on the Fool and the Wise20; although the judging and moralizing is aimed at the 
non-virtue which causes the variability it is difficult to ignore the real socially stigmatizing 
consequences for the subjects of embodied variability whose physicality is traced back to 
human non-virtue - however non-essentializing and ‘no-self-ed’ such causality 
philosophically is meant to be. The non-virtuous fool (bāla) experiences embodied aspects 
of his moral deficit in a variety of impairments, combined in the following stock phrase list 
in the Pāli canon: ‘ugly (or: of inferior class), unsightly, deformed, diseased, or blind or 
crooked or lame or paralyzed’.21  This mnemonic list is usually preceded by a paragraph 
detailing (re-)birth into a socially abject group or caste (nīcakula) such as the 
untouchables.22  The list-heading term dubbaṇṇo, ‘of bad color’, implies both aesthetical 
and social abjection23: the overlaying of physical and social appearances is paramount in 
the South Asian social context of the Buddhist sources, in which social inferiority was and 
largely still is equivalent with corporeal unattractiveness.  The description of a boy in the 
Buddhist Sanskrit Avadāna-Śatakam, a collection of religious-didactic poetic narratives 
probably redacted around the first century CE, drastically exemplifies this marriage of 
social abjection to the non-normative physicality: the youngster is depicted as ‘‘ugly (or: 
of inferior class), unsightly, deformed, his body smeared all over with feces, and foul-
smelling”.24 
The Buddhist “physiomoral discourse of the body”25 includes abject class and non-
normative sex/gender26 and the inferior female birth.27  Any progress on the Buddhist path 
                                                 
18  andhe jiṇṇe mātāpitaro M. 81 ii 48 and 51-52. 
19 For example, the Lesser Chronicle of the Buddhist rulers of Sri Lanka, the Cūl̥avaṃsa, mentions such charity for the 
4th century CE king Buddhadāsa (Mhv 37. 148 and 182); the 7th century CE ruler Aggibodhi (Mhv 45.43) and the 8th 
century CE king Udaya I (Mhv 49. 20). 
20  Bālapaṇḍita-sutta, M. 129, iii 167-178. 
21 dubbaṇṇo duddasiko okoṭimako bavhābādho, kāṇo vā kuṇi vā  khañjo vā pakkhahato vā, Vin II 90 S I 194 A I 107, II 
85, III 385 Pug 51; the Bālapaṇḍita-sutta M 129 III 169 substitutes khañjo ‘lame’ for khujjo ‘humpbacked’.  
22 E.g. M III 169; S I 194 A I 107, II 85, III 385 Pug 51. Additionally, parts of the stock phrase occur separately 
throughout the Pāli canon. 
23 Sanskrit varṇa (Pāli  vaṇṇo) denotes both color and caste. 
24 durvarṇo durdarśano avakoṭimako ‘medhyamrakṣitagātro durgandhaś ca Av 50 i 280; p. 125 Vaidya (abbreviations 
and editions of Sanskrit texts refer to Franklin Edgerton, Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar and Dictionary (1953) 
with occasionally relevant alternative or newer editions added by editor’s name only).     
25 Mrozik, Virtuous Bodies, Ch. 4. 
26 paṇḍaka and intersex; see above Scherer, Variant Dharma. 
27 itthibhāva (cp. Mrozik, Virtuous Bodies, 70-71).  See, for example, the list in the para-canonical verses in the Jātaka 
commentary (J-a I 44) and the statement in the Milindapañha Mil 93 PTS on the inferiority (ittaratā) of woman (itthi, 
note the wordplay!). 
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towards enlightenment is impeded by physiomoral problematic rebirth as the Pāli 
commentarial list of eighteen ‘impossible states’ (abhabbaṭṭḥāna) shows28: among 
humans, the list features the physical abject as blind, deaf, dumb, deformed and leper 
together with the sex/gender abject and the social abject as ‘barbarian’, slave, notorious 
criminal and heretic.29  Within the early Sanskritic Buddhist traditions, such ‘inopportune’ 
(akṣaṇaprāpta) birth as result of karma is described in the Pravrajyāntarāya-sūtra as 
quoted in Śāntideva’s 8th c. Compendium of Discipline:  
 
He is born blind, stupid, dumb, an outcaste - certainly not privileged, a notorious 
slanderer; a sex/gender deficient and deviant (ṣaṇḍaka and paṇḍaka), a perpetual 
slave, a woman, a dog, a pig, a donkey, a camel and a poisonous serpent.30 
 
Another Mahāyāna discourse quoted in the same compendium, the Inquiry of the 
Girl Candrottarā, enumerates being ‘blind, lame, without tongue, and deformed’ among 
the karmic results of sense-attachment or desire (rāga)31: “Those who lead the low-life of 
lust become party to the various multitude of defects.”32  Again, as in the case of the earlier 
quoted Pravrajyāntarāya-sūtra, mental disabilities or learning difficulties33 and various 
animal rebirths are included in the shortly following summary of such physiomoral 
expressions of causality: “Truly, those lustful will continuously be born as blind, deaf, and 
idiotic…”34  With the self-referential ‘cult of the book’ emerging within Mahāyāna praxis, 
disregard for the respective scripture becomes another karmic cause for disadvantageous 
births with variable bodies. The Lotus Sūtra illustrates this when it claims that “those who 
do not have faith in this discourse I dispense, when they are born human again are then 
born idiots, lame, crooked, blind and dull.”  The blasphemer, “foolish and deaf, does not 
hear the dharma (liberating teaching)”; “and when he obtains human birth he becomes 
blind, deaf and idiotic; he is a slave, always poor.”35 
However, the karmic ripening of impairing conditions within one’s lifetime does 
not necessarily preclude spiritual progress and realization.  The canonical texts testify to 
the achievement of variable-bodied and/or impaired monastics; famously, the Ven. 
Bhaddiya ‘the dwarf’ is depicted in the very terms of physiomoral rejection discussed 
above as ‘ugly (or of inferior class), unsightly, deformed’  and as ‘shunned by most 
monks’36  – yet he is praised by the Buddha for his high spiritual achievements.  Another 
example is the story of the blind Elder Cakkhupāla as told in the commentary to the famous 
collection of doctrinal verses, the Dhammapada.  The narrative illustrates the 
Dhammapada’s very first verse on intention-led and mind-governed karma; it relates how 
Cakkhupāla, by accepting the loss of its sight during rigorous asceticism dissolves a great 
karmic obstacle on the spiritual path.      
                                                 
28 Suttanipāta commentary Sn-a i 50 and Apadāna commentary Ap-a 141. 
29 See Toshiichi Endo, Buddha in Theravada Buddhism: A Study of the Concept of Buddha in the Pāli Commentaries 
(Buddhist Cultural Centre: Dehiwala, Sri Lanka, 2002), 160-164, and Mrozik, Virtuous Bodies, 71. 
30 jātyandhaś ca jaḍaś câjihvakaś ca caṇḍālaś [ca] {na} jātu | sukhito bhavaty abhyākhyānabahulaś ca ṣaṇḍakaś ca 
paṇḍakaś ca nityadāsaś ca | strī ca bhavati śvā ca śūkaraś ca gardabhaś côṣṭraś ca āśīviṣaś ca bhavati tatra jātau || 
Śikṣāsamuccaya Śikṣ p. 69; all translations are my own unless indicated otherwise. 
31 kāṇāś ca khañjāś ca vijihvakāś ca | virūpakāś câiva bhavanti rāgāt Candrottarādārikāparipr̥cchā, Śikṣ p. 80. 
32 bhavanti nānāvidhadoṣabhājāś caranti ye kāmacarīṃ jaghanyām (ibid.) 
33 Here denoted by the term visaṃjña cp. above jaḍa. 
34 jātyandhabhāvā vadhirā visaṃjñā | […] bhavanti nityaṃ khalu kāmalolāḥ || Śikṣ p. 80. 
35 Saddharmapuṇḍarīka-sūtra SP 3 verses 122; 129ab; 132 a-c: puruṣātmabhāvaṃ ca yada labhante te kuṇṭhakā 
laṅgaka bhonti tatra | kubjātha kāṇā ca jaḍā jaghanyā aśraddadhantā ima sūtra mahyam || 122; na cāpi so dharma 
śṛṇoti bālo badhiraśca so bhoti acetanaśca | 129ab; manuṣyabhāvatvamupetya cāpi andhatva badhiratva jaḍatvameti | 
parapreṣya so bhoti daridra nityaṃ 3.132a-c.  
36 dubbaṇṇaṁ duddasikaṁ okoṭimakaṁ yebhuyyena bhikkhūnaṁ paribhūtarūpaṃ Ud VII 5, 76. 
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As has become clear, the Buddhist physiomoral encoding of variable corporealities 
through the doctrine of karma can be - and is only - resolved by the nirvāṇic soteriology.  
Such nirvāṇic or bodhi orientation projects a utopia of invariable bliss and translates this 
salvific impetus into the healing activities of enlightenment.  In fact, the Buddha had 
compared the non-essentializing pragmatics of his liberating teachings to a physician 
removing a poisonous arrow without the delay of forensic over-scrutinizing.37  Following 
on from Early Buddhist praises of the Buddha as the unrivalled physician of humanity, the 
‘supreme surgeon’38 who removes the poisons of attachment, aversion and ignorance which 
fuel the ego-delusion, Mahāyāna scriptures metaphorize the spiritual transformation of 
suffering as healing rays born out of the deep contemplative trance and fueled by the higher 
compassion of enlightened beings.39  For example, the influential Mahāyāna scripture 
Discourse of the Golden Light describes in its second chapter the healing contemplation 
rays emitted by the Bodhisattva (enlightenment-being) Ruciraketu, whose name can be 
translated as ‘Radiant Brightness’40:  
 
And all the beings in this triple-thousand great-thousand world-sphere by the 
Buddha’s power became possessed of divine happiness.[…] And beings blind from 
birth see forms with the eye.  And deaf beings hear sounds with the ear.  And 
unconscious beings regain their mindfulness.  And beings whose minds were 
distraught were no longer distraught in mind.  (9) And naked beings became clothed 
in robes.  And hungry beings became full-bellied.  And thirsty beings became 
thirstless.  And disease-afflicted beings became diseaseless.  And beings whose 
bodily organs were defective became possessed of complete organs (tr. 
Emmerick41).  
 
The salvific power of the Bodhisattvas is described in similar ways in the 
Ratnolkadhāraṇī as quoted in Śāntideva’s Compendium, Chapter Eighteen.42  The 
Enlightenment-being’s salvific aspiration is founded upon the wish for universal happiness.  
Hence, the confessional aspiration liturgies include the prayer that all varieties of suffering 
in sentient beings cease.  The Discourse of the Golden Light includes in Chapter Three, the 
‘confession chapter’ (deśanā-parivarta), such an elaborate aspirational prayer of hope and 
healing for all kind of variably disadvantaged43:  
                                                 
37 M 63 i 429.  
38 sallakato anuttaro Sn 560; Mil 215. 
39 For Buddhism and Healing see [Paul Demiéville], Buddhism and Healing: Demiéville’s Article “Byo” from 
Hōbōgirin, translated by Mark Tatz (University Press of America: Lanham, 1985); Raoul Birnbaum, The Healing 
Buddha (Shambhala: Boston, 1989); Tadeusz Skorupski, ‘Health and Suffering in Buddhism: Doctrinal and Existential 
Considerations,’ in Religion, Health and Suffering, edited by J.R. Hinnells and R. Porter (Kegan Paul International: 
London, 1999), 139-165; and Anālayo, ‘Healing in Early Buddhism’ Buddhist Studies Review 32n1, 2015, 19-33. 
40 Suvarṇaprabhāsottama-sūtra Sv 8-9 sarve cāsmiṃstrisāhasramahāsāhasralokadhātau sattvā buddhānubhāvena 
divyasukhena samanvāgatā babhūvuḥ |  jātyandhāśca sattvā rūpāṇi paśyanti sma | vadhirāśca sattvāḥ sattvebhyaḥ 
śabdāni śṛṇvanti | unmattāśca sattvāḥ smṛtiṃ pratilabhante ‘vikṣiptacittāśca smṛtimanto babhū-| vuḥ | nagnāśca 
sattvāścīvaraprāvṛtā (Bagchi 5) babhūvuḥ | jighatsitāśca sattvāḥ paripūrṇagātrā babhūvuḥ | tṛṣitāśca sattvā 
vigatatṛṣṇā babhūvaḥ | rogaspṛṣṭāśca sattvā vigatarogā babhūvuḥ | hīnakāyāśca sattvāḥ paripūrṇendriyā babhūvuḥ |  
(I have omitted […] ‘Beings whose senses were incomplete became possessed of all their senses’, which is most likely 
an interpolation duplicating the concluding sentence quoted and only found in the Tibetan and Chinese versions, but not 
in the Sanskrit manuscripts. Nobel conjected and added this passage as aparipūrṇendriyāḥ sattvāḥ 
sarvendriyasamanvāgatā babhūvuḥ). 
41 Ronald E. Emmerick, The Sutra of Golden Light: Being a Translation of the Suvarnabhasottamasutra (Pāli Text 
Society: Oxford, 2001), 4.  
42 See in particular Śikṣ 341-2. 
43 Sv verses 3.81-83 (p. 39 Nobel) andhāśca paśyantu vicitrarūpān vadhirāśca śṛṇvantu manojñaghoṣān || 81 nagnāśca 
vastrāṇi labhantu citrā daridrasattvāśca dhanāṃllabhantu | 82ab mā kasyaciddhāvatu duḥkhavedanā sudarśanāḥ 
sattva bhavantu sarve | abhirūpaprāsādikasaumyarūpā anekasukhasaṃcita nitya bhontu || 83 
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And may the blind see the various forms, the deaf hear delightful sounds, the naked 
obtain various garments, poor beings obtain treasures […] May the experience of 
woe harm no one.  May all beings be good-looking.  May they have beautiful, 
gracious, auspicious forms and continually have a heap of numerous blessings (tr. 
Emmerick44). 
 
The popularity of the aspirational hope for those in disadvantaging variabilities is 
evidenced by the intertextual variation of key formulations found throughout Buddhist 
literatures.  For example, most influentially, the seventh to eighth century CE Buddhist 
poet-philosopher Śāntideva, in the concluding chapter of his seminal Entering the Path to 
Enlightenment (Bodhicaryāvatāra), concisely includes an only slight alteration to a central 
verse in the Sūtra’s wishing prayer: ‘May the blind see and may the deaf hear always.’45 
What emerges from the discussion above are contradicting and idiosyncratic 
Buddhist approaches to embodied variance and impairment, which exemplify attempts to 
negotiate different hegemonic social regimes of bio-power with soteriological universalism 
and inclusiveness.  Buddhist modernisms with their main modes of detraditionalization, 
demythologization and psychologization46 have found creative ways to propagate the 
demarginalization of the Buddhist ‘un-ordainable’, including, in modern terms, convicts; 
LGBT people; sex workers; and the ‘disabled’ variable.47  Within the heterogeneous 
plethora of contemporary Buddhist modernist groups and flows called ‘Socially Engaged 
Buddhism’ karma is inventively rethought in terms of social justice and human rights 
advocacy.48  Socially Engaged Buddhists most visibly aim their activism at ecological and 
socio-economic cause and they campaign for peace and gender equality; but just as in the 
case of Buddhist LGBT liberation, Buddhist ‘disability’ activism appears to be comparably 
underdeveloped49, with the exception of Buddhist and Buddhist-derived approaches to 
depression and anxiety such as Mindfulness-Based Cognitive Therapy or Mindfulness 
Based Stress Reduction.50  Still, variable-bodied people are able to self-narrate meaning 
and hope through Buddhism.51 Buddhist Modernist ‘disabled’ writers such as postpolio 
paraplegic Lorenzo Milam in his CripZen: A Manual for Survival, and right-hand-lacking 
Joan Tollifson in her Bare-Bones Meditation are utilizing the experience of variability for 
spiritual transformation and offer pathways to variable Buddhist empowerment.52 
The time seems ripe for Socially Engaged Buddhist Crip Liberation and a fuller 
Buddhist ‘theology’ of embodied variability.  The idiosyncratic and contradictory 
orientations of social marginalizing and soteriological inclusiveness found within Buddhist 
thought on human embodied variance by karma theory can firmly be reintegrated and 
dissolved by refocusing embodied experience from an essentialized individual subject and 
its misconstrued individualized past, to the opportunity in the here and now for the future.  
As the leading socially engaged, Buddhist Theorist David Loy points out:   
                                                 
44 Emmerick, The Sutra of Golden Light, 16. 
45 Bodhicaryāvatāra BCA 10.19ab andhāḥ paśyantu rūpāṇi śṛṇvantu badhirāḥ sadā (ed. Minaev 1889; the tenth 
chapter is missing in Prajñākaramati’s commentary ed. by de la Vallée Poussin 1904-1914). 
46 McMahan, The Making of Buddhist Modernism, 45-57. 
47 Cp. Christopher Queen, ‘Introduction: From Altruism to Activism,’ in Action Dharma: New Studies in Engaged 
Buddhism, edited by Christopher Queen, Charles Prebish and Damien Keown, pp. 1-35 (RoutledgeCurzon: London, 
2003), 18. 
48 See Sally B. King, Socially Engaged Buddhism (University of Hawai’I Press: Honolulu, 2009). 
49 See King Socially Engaged Buddhism, 163-164. 
50 See, e.g., Jon Kabat-Zinn, ‘Some Reflections on the Origins of MBSR, Skillful Means, and the Trouble with Maps’, 
Contemporary Buddhism, 12n1, 2001, 281-306.  
51 For example, see Darla Y. Schumm and Michael Stoltzfus, ‘Chronic Illness and Disability: Narratives of Suffering 
and Healing in Buddhism and Christianity ‘, Journal of Religion, Disability & Health, 11:3, 2004, 5-21 and Kampol 
Thongbunnum, Bright and Shining Mind in a Disabled Body (Friends of Morak Society: Bangkok, 2007). 
52 See Susan Squier, ‘Meditation, Disability, and Identity’, Literature and Medicine 23n1, 2004, 23-45. 
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Karma is better understood as the key to spiritual development ... When we add the 
Buddhist teaching about not-self  […] We can see that karma is not something the 
self has, it is what the sense of self is […].53 
 
By utilizing a twofold Buddhist hermeneutics of preliminary (socio-cultural) and 
ultimate (soteriological) contexts, I argue accordingly for a Buddhist liberation ‘theology’ 
and praxis as non-judgmental, demarginalized and dehegemonized, celebratory approaches 
to bodily variability and neuro-diversity, in the full acknowledgment of the universal 
principle of saṃsāric conditionality and the individual expression of saṃsāric challenges.   
Despite the multiple examples of missed opportunities to challenge embodied and 
body-oppressive normativities - and the margins they produce – in Buddhist cultural 
contexts, I maintain that Buddhist notions such as (re)birth as a ‘continuity without 
identity’, ‘no-self’ and ‘interdependency’ or ‘inter-being’54 and as karma taking charge of 
the future rather than paying a debt to the past offers a wide array of emancipatory impulses, 
which can provide new tools to critical ‘disability’ theory and advocacy. Oppressive body-
normalcy as regimes of bio-power can be successfully critiqued through Buddhist 
(modernist) social theory, which provides pathways for navigating variability-affirming 
anthroposcapes.  
 
Conclusion   
Buddhist realities, Buddhist utopias clash, and their battleground are real, historical 
defined and culturally refined embodied experiences of variance, marginalization, 
stigmatization, but also experiences of emancipation, transformation and liberation.  The 
shift advocated in this edited volume toward telling historical bodies, far from heralding an 
end of theory, ought to decisively (in)form contemporary practical philosophy, social 
theory and cultural critique from the grassroots and is bound to co-create new accents and 
insights in critical theory, including Foucauldian derived approaches; Feminist; and Queer 
Theories.  The human journey through the temporal and spatial landscape of our embodied 
experiences manifests within primary parameters of identity and difference; inside and 
outside; sameness and otherness; inclusion and rejection.  Rather than being binary 
absolutes, the fundamental parameters of identitarian belonging form in protean, shifting 
ways with situation, context, time and space always in orientation to an underlying 
‘prototype’55 center attracting the most enduring, extreme and recognizable example.  The 
Lakoffian prototype distribution and its center(s) for psycho-social identitarian recognition 
is hence paradoxically oriented at an almost impossible (hence extreme) ideal; while each 
individual’s embodied human experience is unique and varied, it is co-shaped by 
parameters gauging its distance to the center of the human prototype, which in many 
cultures through history manifests as the essentialized ideal of the (binary, cisgender) male 
(patriarchal bias; sexism; cisgenderism; transphobia); racially elite-constructed (as for 
example in white supremacy; racism; colorism); heterosexual (homo, lesbo-, bi-, 
queerophobia); abled-bodied (ableism), young (ageism), healthy (nosemaphobia) and 
beautiful (lookism; beauty-fetishism; fat-ism; cacophobia) person. The closer to the center 
individuals performs their embodiment, the stronger is their participation in psycho-social 
power (the phallus in Lacan’s terms).  In particular, in relationship to transphobia, 
homophobia and sexism I have suggested to think of the underlying power dynamic as 
                                                 
53 David R. Loy, Money, Sex, War, Karma: Notes for a Buddhist Revolution (Wisdom: Boston, 2008), 61. 
54 ‘Inter-being’ is a term coined and popularized by Thich Nhat Hanh, a Vietnamese Zen teacher who also is credited 
with coining the term ‘Socially Engaged Buddhism’.  
55 George Lakoff, Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal about the Mind (University of 
Chicago Press: Chicago and London, 1987). 
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aphallophobia56: the very fear of losing that individually channeled societal power of the 
essentialized, ideal center.  Extending the aphallophobia-principle to intersections beyond 
heteropatriarchal oppressions with regard to gender and sexuality, I maintain that the key 
struggle for inclusion and social justice lies exactly in the rethinking of the illusion of 
identitarian stabilities, essentialism or in other words the ideal yet illusionary and random 
centers of belonging.  The radical acceptance of human variability transforms the struggle 
to include variabled embodiments within a projected center of ‘ontological security’57 into 
the celebratory recognition of belonging as being the same, only different: varyingly 
performed embodiment, flowing from time and space and context and situation.  Inhabiting 
such variable anthroposcapes without center and margin restores the possibility of 
(biographically fluid or relatively static) individual body-performances without creating 
oppressive body-normativities.  
In terms of post-phallic forms of governmentality, after heteropatriarchy and 
theocracy, the ethical imperative of social action can re-establish itself as aiming at the full 
protection of the integrity of the variably embodied individual.  Where freedom from harm 
and suffering is established as highest legal good, competing societal discourses of 
meaning-making are disempowered to affect oppressively the variable embodied 
individual.  These discourses include the two dominant exponents of oppressive cultural 
modes, the medical-pathologizing and the religious-stigmatizing discourses.58  Culturally 
harmful practices, disconnected from hegemonizing and essentializing discourses, can be 
discontinued for the benefit of the suffering individual.  If the individuals’ rights to being 
asserted within their own variable center and their freedom from harm become the key 
parameters of trans-national solidarity, embodied experiences can become the pivotal 
angles to challenge oppression without the need to navigate a jungle of competing 
hierarchies of rights and cultural relativisms: this individual, ‘body-without-center-and-
margin’ angle changes the evaluation of both contested and mainstream harmful practices, 
including the binarist sex inscription through mutilation of healthy infant intersex bodies; 
the pseudo-medical and/or religious scarring and penile desensitizing of healthy male infant 
bodies in the form of circumcision; the dramatic heteropatriarchal mutilation of healthy 
female bodies in the form of Female Genital Cutting (FGC); and the ageist, sexist and 
misogynic re-’normatizing’ mutilation of healthy bodies through cosmetic surgeries, only 
to name a few examples. Within these debate, the proposed dehegemonic and aphallic 
affirmation of variable-bodily integrity differs from some arguments around individual 
‘agency’, which dominate contemporary postcolonial, feminist and queer intersectional 
discourse and which in their well-meant privileging of decolonization and postcolonial and 
subaltern agency sometimes disempower inter-human solidarity and hence ignore the real, 
embodied suffering of the subject constructed as agentive.  The here proposed approach is 
capable of devaluing the oppressive contexts (rather than affirming it), which co-shape 
‘agentive’ decisions manifested as pseudo-agency or disempowered agency such as is the 
case in women’s complicity to oppressive heteropatriarchy in the context of, among others, 
dowry; behavioral prohibitions and prescriptions, e.g. regarding clothes; FGC and other 
culturally harmful practices; or in the case of developing ‘Stockholm syndrome’ among 
queer subjects in fundamentalist queerophobic religious contexts.59 
Infusing the concept of variability and, more broadly, critical social theory with the 
opportunities afforded by Buddhist (modernist) philosophies I maintain that pathways 
appear for navigating variability-affirming ‘anthroposcapes’.  By relaxing the artificial 
                                                 
56 Scherer, ‘Crossings and Dwellings’. 
57 Anthony Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity: self and Society in the Late Modern Age (Polity Press: Cambridge, 
1991), Ch. 2. 
58 Bee Scherer, ‘QueerThinking Religion: Queering Religious Paradigms’, Scholar & Feminist Online 2016 (forthc.). 
59 Ibid. 
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boundaries of our anxious Selfhood into the ravishing of ontological uncertainty and 
fluidity we are able to perform compassion without essentialized Self; solidarity without 
colonizing and hegemonizing overpowering; and dehegemonized embodiment, same only 
different.  
